Using a simple empirical strategy, we decode the information in insider trades. Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable "routine" insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Stripping away these routine trades, which comprise over half the entire universe of insider trades, leaves a set of information-rich "opportunistic" trades that contains all the predictive power in the insider trading universe. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on opportunistic insider trades yields valueweight abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. Further, opportunistic trades predict future news and events at a firm level, while routine trades do not. JEL Classification: Insider trading, information flow, asset prices
Information events bombard securities markets each day. The task of price setters in these markets is to determine which of these events, and what parts of their contents, have insight into firm value. A class of these information events that is especially difficult to decipher is the trading activity of corporate insiders. Insiders are a unique class of traders as they, by definition, have favored access to private information about the given firm. Because of this preferential access, insiders are subject to increased scrutiny, regulation, and restrictions regarding their trading activities. Another unique aspect of insiders is that they often receive a large proportion of their stakes in firms through non-market transactions (e.g. stock grants). Through initial ownership, stock grants, and other market transactions, insiders' firm stockholdings are often a non-trivial percentage of their wealth.
Thus personal liquidity and diversification motives, in addition to signaling and regulatory issues, will affect the timing and nature of insider trades, making it more difficult for price setters to interpret any given insider trade as informative or not.
Using a simple, novel approach, we decode the information in insider trades, showing that there is predictable, identifiable "routine" insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Classifying trades in this way allows us to strip away these uninformative signals, leaving information-rich "opportunistic" trades that contain all of the predictive power for future firm news, events, and returns.
Our analysis rests on the simple idea that insiders, while possessing private information, trade for many reasons. For example, routine sells by insiders are commonplace in the market, and can be driven by diversification or liquidity reasons, with the insider wanting to signal that he is not trading on information about the firm (e.g., Bill Gates). Routine buys, on the other hand, may occur after an insider receives a bonus; since bonuses are often paid out in the same month each year, and since insiders often receive discount plans on their company stock (and hence are more likely to buy the stock), insider buying in the same calendar month is common and often uninformative. Thus if one can classify these trades ex-ante that are routine trades (and so less informative), one can better identify the true information that insiders contain and thus develop a richer understanding of firm-level asset prices.
To better understand our approach, consider the following example from our sample.
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Moonburst is a large, publicly traded firm, which in 1994 operated in over 40 states, and employed more than 30,000 people. The firm had a number of insiders. In particular, two of these insiders were actively trading, but in much different ways. In Figure 1 , we illustrate what the trades of both of these insiders looked like from January 1994 to June 1996. The first insider (the routine trader), traded consistently over the time period, routinely trading in each and every month. The second insider (the opportunistic trader), who also happens to be the CFO of Moonburst, traded much differently. His trades came at very selective times, as can be seen in Figure 1 .
Not only do the trades of the opportunistic trader appear to contain much more information for prices, they also have predictive ability over future news.
For instance, following the June 1996 trade of the opportunistic trader, there were 15 news announcements in the subsequent month. These news articles highlighted the important company announcement that it would be delaying its earnings announcement for the given quarter, and speculated as to why. This large number of news was accompanied with a -10.0% return in the month. These patterns regarding the predictability of news announcements are true throughout the lives of these Moonburst routine and opportunistic traders. In sum, the trades of the opportunistic trader predict over twice as many news announcements as the trades of routine traders. What is important to note here is that both the opportunistic and routine traders were trading in their respective manners throughout their entire trading histories, so one could predictably identify these traders as either opportunistic or routine traders before the period we have shown here. We exploit this ability to predictably classify insiders into these two classes of traders throughout the paper.
Had one taken the naïve strategy of replicating all insider trades, one would have sold short Moonburst each month over this two and a half year period and made an average monthly return of -2.5% (as the monthly return was +2.5%). If, on the other hand, one were to use the fact that different insider behavior conveys different information, in a potentially predictable way, one could have sold short in only the months when the opportunistic insider sold, and made an average of 10.9% during these trading months (or roughly 70 bp per month over the full two and a half years).
In this paper we demonstrate that the above example of Moonburst represents a much more systematic pattern across the entire universe of corporate insiders and publicly traded firms. We are able to systematically and predictably identify insiders as either opportunistic or routine traders throughout our sample period . Further, an attractive feature of our approach is that our classification scheme essentially divides the insider trading universe in half, with roughly 45% of all trades originating from opportunistic traders, and 55% of all trades originating from routine traders. We show that the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero, indicating that our approach is able to weed out more than half the universe of insider trades, and specifically the half that has no predictive power for future returns or firm news. Meanwhile, the half that remains contains all the predictive power in the insider trading universe.
Our empirical strategy for identifying routine traders is simple. For each insider, we analyze her past trading history, and look for consistent patterns in the timing of trades. Specifically, we define a routine trader as an insider who placed a trade in the same calendar month for at least a certain number of years in the past. We then define opportunistic traders as everyone else, i.e. those insiders for whom we cannot detect an obvious discernible pattern in the past timing of their trades. We thus designate all insiders as either routine traders or opportunistic traders at the beginning of each calendar year, based on their past history of trades, and then look to see how they trade from that point onwards.
We show that focusing only on the trades of opportunistic traders allows us to weed out uninformative signals and identify a set of information-rich trades that are powerful predictors of future firm returns, news, and events. For example, a long-short portfolio that exploits solely the trades of opportunistic traders (opportunistic buys minus opportunistic sells) earns value-weight abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month (9.8 percent annualized, t=2.15), and equal-weight abnormal returns of 180 basis points per month (21.6 percent annualized, t=6.07).
Meanwhile, a portfolio that mimics the behavior of routine traders (routine buys minus routine sells) earns value-weight returns of -20 basis points per month (t=-0.57), and equal-weight returns of only 43 basis points per month (t=1.73).
Importantly, we show that over half of the improvement in predictive power gained by focusing on opportunistic trades comes from the superior performance of opportunistic sells relative to routine sells; this is in contrast to much of the literature (see Jeng et al. (2003) for a discussion), which generally finds weak evidence on the profitability of insider sales. Further, we find that the returns to these opportunistic trades continue to rise for roughly six months following the opportunistic trading month, and then level off, with no reversal. Thus, it appears that the information being conveyed through the trades of opportunistic insiders has lasting implications for firm values.
We also examine if the number of trades of a given type (i.e., the strength of the signal) conveys incremental information above and beyond the mere knowledge that a particular type of trade took place. We find that this is the case: the abnormal future returns of a firm are significantly higher the more opportunistic buys occur, and significantly lower the more opportunistic sells occur. In terms of magnitude, a one-standard deviation increase in the number of opportunistic buys predicts an increased abnormal return of 35 basis points per month in the following month (t=4.56), while a one-standard deviation increase in the number of opportunistic sells results in a 29 basis point lower abnormal return (t=4.97). In contrast, a similar move in the number of routine trades (both buys and sells) at a firm has a statistically insignificant and near zero predictive power for future returns.
Next we explore the mechanism at work behind our findings by analyzing firm-level news and events, as well as opportunistic trading after SEC news releases regarding illegal insider trading. If opportunistic trades truly do contain important information for the future of the firm, we might expect to see this revealed in future news and events related to the firm. We find that the trades of opportunistic insiders show significant predictive power for future news about the firm, while trades by routine insiders do not. Meanwhile, consistent with the idea that opportunistic traders dampen their trading activity when the potential costs of illegal insider trading increase, we find that the fraction of traders who are opportunistic in a given month is negatively related to the number of recent news releases by the SEC regarding illegal insider trading cases. Further, we examine which types of opportunistic insiders execute trades before information events, and find evidence that local insiders, who we might expect to be more informed exante, have opportunistic trades that are especially informative for future information events.
Lastly, we perform a variety of robustness checks to verify that our results are not concentrated in certain types of stocks, or at certain specific times. We show that our main result that opportunistic trades are more informative than routine trades holds for both large stocks and small stocks, both heavily-traded stocks and lightly-traded stocks, and both inside and outside explicit "blackout" periods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I of the paper provides a brief background and literature review, while Section II describes our data on insider transactions, as well as the other data we use in the paper. Section III provides the main results on the performance of opportunistic traders versus routine traders. Section IV explores the mechanism behind the predictive power of opportunistic trades, and Section V provides some robustness checks. Section VI concludes.
I. The setting
The trades of corporate insiders are among the most widely scrutinized activities in the stock market each day. Regulators, investment managers, media members, and academics continually parse these trades for signs of illicit behavior, and for signals about a company's future prospects. Not surprisingly, the widespread interest in insider trading has spawned a large empirical literature, most of which examines the cross-sectional return forecasting ability of insider trades aggregated at the firm level. By contrast, our focus is on the individual insiders themselves and their past trading records, and as such our approach tries to isolate predictable variation in the informativeness of insider trades by identifying which insiders are likely to be trading on information and which are not.
Numerous papers study the cross-sectional variation of future stock returns as a function of past insider-trading activity. Many of these articles (see, for example, Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) , Jaffe (1974) , Seyhun (1986 ), Rozeff and Zaman (1988 , Lin and Howe (1990) , Bettis, Vickery, and Vickery (1997) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) ) focus on the abnormal returns to firms in relation to various metrics of firm-level insider trading frequency over well-defined periods. Seyhun (1998) per year, while insider sales do not earn significant abnormal returns.
Also relevant to our findings are a series of papers, many in the accounting literature, that examine insider trading around/before various types of firm events.
For example, with respect to future earnings news, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) show that insider trades reflect both contrarian beliefs and superior information about future cash flow realizations, while Ke, Huddard and Petroni (2003) demonstrate that insiders trade before significant accounting disclosures as much as two years prior to the disclosure. 3 In related work, Kahle (2000) finds that the overview of the Thomson Reuters insiders database, as well as the subset of the data for which we can define the "routine" and "opportunistic" traders that feature in our analysis. As noted earlier, routine trades are made for a variety of reasons. For example, routine sells by insiders are often driven by diversification or liquidity reasons, with the insider wanting to signal that he is not trading on information about the firm (e.g., Bill Gates). Routine buys, on the other hand, may occur after an insider receives a bonus; since bonuses are generally paid out in the same month each year, and since insiders often receive discount plans on their company stock (and hence are more likely to buy the stock), insider buying in the same calendar month is common and often uninformative.
We require an insider to make at least one trade in each of the three preceding years in order to define her as either an opportunistic or a routine trader. Specifically, we define a routine trader as an insider who placed a trade in the same calendar month for at least three consecutive years.
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We then define opportunistic traders as everyone else, i.e. those insiders for whom we cannot detect an obvious discernible pattern in the past timing of their trades. We thus designate all insiders as either routine traders or opportunistic traders at the beginning of each calendar year, based on their past history of trades, and then look to see how they trade from that point onwards. All subsequent trades that are made after we classify each insider as either routine or opportunistic are then placed into one of two buckets: a) "routine trades" (i.e., all trades made by routine traders), and b) "opportunistic trades" (i.e., all trades made by opportunistic traders). Note that this simple algorithm for identifying routine buying or selling by insiders is clearly a noisy proxy for actual routine trading; we have experimented with more refined measures (with similar and often stronger results), 8 but these simple measures are sufficient to illustrate our main point. Table I indicates that by implementing our routine trade identification assumptions (e.g., requiring three years of past insider transactions), our final sample is about one-third the size of the entire sample of insider transactions.
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Panel A shows that our sample is tilted towards bigger stocks, and slightly towards growth stocks (i.e., lower book-to-market ratios). We can also see this in Figure 2 .
Specifically, from Figure 2 , our insider sample has fewer micro-cap stocks (smallest decile) and roughly twice the percentage of largest decile stocks as compared to the CRSP universe. Panel B of Table I shows that the insiders we include in our sample have a somewhat higher average number of trades (4.8 buys to 2.4, and 8.2 sells to 4.1) relative to all insiders.
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We classify roughly 64% of insider purchases and 52% of insider sales as routine trades; hence 36% of insider purchases and 48% of insider sales are classified as opportunistic trades. Overall, trades made by routine traders comprise 55% of the total sample, while trades made by opportunistic traders represent 45% of the total sample. This roughly 50/50 split in the data, coupled with our subsequent results showing that all the predictive power (in terms of future firm returns and news) is concentrated among the opportunistic trades, suggests that our identification procedure is able to weed out a set of uninformative signals that makes up more than half the universe of insider trades. Table II presents correlation coefficients for the main variables that feature in our analysis. The number of insider sells, and particularly routine sells, is higher for larger firms and growth firms, while the number of insider buys, and particularly opportunistic buys, is higher for smaller firms and value firms.
Consistent with the past literature, insiders are contrarian, buying after low past returns (measured over the prior 12 months) and selling after high past returns.
10 Note that the average number of trades only includes trades made after we classify an insider as opportunistic or routine. All insiders in our sample have at least three more years worth of trades that we use to classify insiders, but do not use in our subsequent tests.
III. Results: Performance of Opportunistic Trades versus Routine Trades
In this section we examine the future stock return predictability of insider transactions. The goal of our approach is to identify, out of the tens of thousands of insider trades made each year, which trades are truly informative. To do so we implement our routine trade classification, and then analyze the stock return performance of routine trades versus opportunistic trades.
Our first tests employ regressions of one-month-ahead stock returns on indicators for routine and opportunistic trades. We run pooled regressions with standard errors clustered at the firm level; we also include month fixed effects where indicated. In addition, we include controls for well-known determinants of stock returns, such as size (log of market capitalization), (log) book-to-market ratio, one-month lagged returns, and cumulative past returns from month t-12 to t-2.
Table III presents these regression results. Columns 3 and 6 illustrate the main result of the paper: both opportunistic buys and opportunistic sells are strong predictors of future returns, while routine buys and sells are not. For example, the coefficient on opportunistic buys in column 3 indicates that opportunistic buys yield an incremental 90 basis points (t=4.64) in the following month relative to all insider trades. Meanwhile, routine buys yield only 14 additional basis points (t=0.81). The difference in the coefficients on opportunistic buys and routine buys (=76 basis points) is statistically significant (F-test=10.07, p-value=0.002). 11 The results for sells are similar: Column 6 shows that opportunistic sells earn an 11 The test of equality of routine and opportunistic coefficients is based on the point estimates and the robust covariance matrix of the estimates (clustered at the firm level).
additional -78 basis points (t=5.67), while routine sells earn +4 additional basis points (t=0.24). Again, this difference between opportunistic sells and routine sells is large (=-82 basis points) and statistically significant (F-test=29.30, pvalue=0.000).
Columns 7-9 of Table III Overall, the combined differences in the coefficients between opportunistic trades and routine trades in Table III translate into an increase of 158 basis points per month in the predictive ability of opportunistic trades relative to routine trades. 12 Additionally, our results demonstrate that over half the improvement in predictive power gained by focusing on opportunistic trades comes from the superior performance of opportunistic sells relative to routine sells; as noted earlier, this is in contrast to much of the literature (see Jeng et al. (2003) for a discussion), which often struggles to find evidence that insider sales predict lower future returns.
Next we analyze the returns of portfolios formed according to our routine trade classification scheme. These provide a further test of the predictive ability of opportunistic versus routine trades. To construct our portfolios, we identify opportunistic and routine trades each month, and then form opportunistic buy, opportunistic sell, routine buy, and routine sell portfolios containing these stocks.
We then hold these stocks over the month following these insider trades; at the end of the month, we rebalance the portfolios based on new insider trades.
Although the official SEC regulation was a requirement to report by the tenth day of the following month (which was then changed to 2 days after the trade date in 2002), nearly all of the trades in our sample were reported to the SEC on the day of the trade, so we are confident they were available at portfolio formation here.
We compute both equal-and value-weight portfolios, and report the results in Table IV . Table IV reports raw portfolio returns, as well as risk-adjusted portfolio returns (alphas) for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the five-factor model including a liquidity factor, as well as DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns. 13 Table IV shows that a portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the trades made by opportunistic traders earns large and significant returns, while a strategy that follows the trades of routine traders does not. For example, the equal-weight portfolio that goes long opportunistic buys and short opportunistic sells earns a five-factor alpha of 180 basis points per month (t=6.07), or over 21.6% per year, while the portfolio that goes long routine 13 Titman (1997, 1998) suggest that characteristics can be better predictors of future returns than factor loadings. Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , we subtract from each stock return the return on a portfolio of firms matched on market equity, market-book, and prior one-year return quintiles (a total of 125 matching portfolios). These 125 portfolios are reformed every month based on the market equity, M/B ratio, and prior year return from the previous month. The portfolios are equal weighted and the quintiles are defined with respect to the entire CRSP universe in that month. We term these abnormal returns DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns.
buys and short routine sells earns a only marginally significant 43 basis points per month (t=1.73).
The bottom half of Table IV reveals a similar pattern for value-weight returns. While the spread between routine buys and routine sells is actually negative when using value-weight returns, the spread in five-factor alphas between opportunistic buys and opportunistic sells is a positive and significant 82 basis points per month (t=2.15), or 9.8% per year. Thus our predictability evidence is not limited to smaller firms, as in some prior studies that use insider trading data (see Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for a discussion). Further, these results again demonstrate that all of the return predictability in the insider universe is concentrated within the trades of opportunistic traders.
In Figure 3 we plot event-time returns based on the portfolios out to twelve months, to illustrate the longer-term performance of opportunistic trades relative to routine trades. Figure 3 indicates that the twelve-month event-time return on a value-weight four-leg spread portfolio (=[Opportunistic Buy-Opportunistic Sells]-[Routine Buys-Routine Sells]) is roughly 4%; for the equal-weight four-leg spread portfolio, the twelve-month event-time return is roughly 8%. In both cases, returns continue to rise for the first six months, and then level off, with no reversal. This suggests that the information being conveyed through the trades of opportunistic insiders has a lasting impact on firm value.
Taken as a whole, the findings in Table IV and Figure 3 corroborate our earlier regression results, and provide economically and statistically significant evidence that insider trades by opportunistic traders are much more informative than insider trades by routine traders.
Next we investigate the impact of trade clustering on the relative performance of opportunistic trades and routine trades, under the hypothesis that the number of a given type of trade (i.e., the strength of the signal) may convey incremental information above and beyond the mere knowledge that a particular type of trade took place. Specifically, instead of using a simple indicator variable on the righthand side of our regressions to identify the execution of any routine or opportunistic trades, we now use the actual number of each type of trade as our independent variable and run the same predictive regressions as before. Tables III-V indicate that opportunistic trades, and the intensity of these trades, are informative for future returns, while routine trades are not. These findings suggest that the ability to predictably classify insiders into either routine or opportunistic traders, using our simple empirical strategy, allows one to focus in on the half of the insider universe that contains all the informative trades.
IV. Mechanism
In this section we examine information events and the timing of insider transactions. Our goal is to explore the mechanism behind the large return predictability that we observe following opportunistic trades.
We start by examining whether opportunistic trades are more likely than routine trades to precede important information events for the firm. To do so, we Table V , Column 9 using a Fama-MacBeth estimation gives buy and sell coefficients of 0.70 (t=3.72) and -0.40 (t=-2.86), and using month and firm fixed effects gives coefficients of 0.56 (t=2.46) and -0.21 (t=2.23).
announcements). 15 We use the number of firm-level information events in a given category in a given month as our left-hand side variable, and control for the general level of news about the firm on the right-hand side (using, for example, the number of information events last month, and the average number of information events over the prior six months). As in Tables III and V, we also control for firmlevel measures of size, book-to-market, and past returns. Looking specifically at firm news, Columns 4-6 show that opportunistic insider trades are strongly predictive of future headline news events. The coefficient on opportunistic trades in Column 6 (=0.03, t=3.26) implies that for a 15 We exclude other firm events such as earnings announcements and dividend announcements that are often pre-scheduled far in advance and subject to explicit insider trading blackout periods.
one-standard deviation move in the number of opportunistic trades, the firm experiences 1.0 more headline news events next month relative to an average of 3.3 events per month (median=3); in percentage terms this translates to a 32% to 35% increase in the number of headline news events.
Next we explore the behavior of opportunistic traders in the wake of news about illegal insider trading litigation cases. Since opportunistic trades predict future firm-level returns, as well as future firm-level news, it is plausible that opportunistic traders might be especially sensitive to the potential costs and penalties associated with illegal insider trading. We test this idea by regressing the fraction of insiders trading in a given month who are opportunistic on recent SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider trading. Specifically, the dependent variable we examine is the number of opportunistic insiders trading in month t+1 divided by the number of all insiders trading in month t+1, and the independent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider activity in month t.
We also include control variables for the fraction of opportunistic insiders trading in month t and month t-1, the CRSP value-weight market return in month t, the standard deviation of daily market returns in month t, and various windows of past cumulative market returns (month t-3 to t-1, month t-6 to t-1, and month t-12 to t-1). outside/independent directors (where independent directors are identified using the "role-code" variable in the Thomson database).
17 Table VIII provides modest evidence consistent with the idea that informed opportunistic insiders trade more before information events than other opportunistic insiders. Specifically, the first column of Table VIII indicates that the number of opportunistic trades by local insiders is positively related to the total number of firm-level information events in the following month. The magnitude of the coefficient in Column 1 (=0.03, t=2.85) implies that for a onestandard deviation move in the number of opportunistic trades by locals, the firm 16 Note that not all insiders are necessarily directors. The class of insiders includes non-directors, inside directors, and outside directors. 17 We have also examined the characteristics of opportunistic versus routine traders in a logit framework. Their characteristics are, by and large, remarkably similar; e.g., the percentage of insiders that are local, independent, or senior, are not reliably different across the two groups. experiences 1.0 additional information events next month (so a roughly 20% increase, with an average of 4.8 and median of 5). By contrast, comparing these to the opportunistic trades of the other classes of insiders in Columns 2-4, and especially in the full specification of Column 5, we find no significant difference in the explanatory power between the opportunistic trades of independent directors, senior insiders, or inside directors. Given the evidence in Ravina and Sapienza (2009) that the difference in the profitability of insider trades by executives relative to those by independent directors is quite small, these results may not be surprising.
V. Robustness
In this section we perform a series of additional tests in order to evaluate the robustness of our findings. The goal is to verify that our results are not concentrated in certain types of stocks, or at certain specific times. To do so, we examine a variety of subsamples, such as large stocks versus small stocks, stocks heavily-traded by insiders versus stocks lightly-traded by insiders, and finally trades made only during specific times (such as inside or outside explicit "blackout" windows). where market cap is measured in December of the prior year. These results show that opportunistic trades (both buys and sells) predict returns for both large stocks and small stocks, while routine trades (both buys and sells) are uninformative for both large and small stocks.
Next we explore if insider trading intensity (see Seyhun (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) ) is related to our findings. Specifically, Columns 5 and 6 (7 and 8) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the distribution of fraction of shares outstanding traded by insiders in the prior year. Again we find that both opportunistic buys and sells are strongly predictive of future returns for both high-and low-intensity stocks. Meanwhile, routine sells do not predict future returns for high-or low-intensity stocks. Routine buys exhibit marginal predictability, but only for high-intensity stocks, and with only roughly a third the magnitude of the opportunistic buys.
Finally, we explore if our results are concentrated inside (or outside) explicit "blackout" windows. Blackout windows are times during which insiders are allegedly prohibited from trading in their company's stock. Although these windows vary by firm (see Bettis, Coles, and Lemon (2000) ), many firms explicitly allow insider trading solely during the month following a quarterly earnings announcement (e.g., trading days +3 to +24 after an earnings release). Note that in our data we do observe frequent trading outside this post-earnings (+3 to +24 day) trading window for many firms, but this stringent window is a time during which insider trading is unambiguously permitted by many firms. Hence, exploring the behavior of opportunistic versus routine traders inside and outside this window allows us to assess the impact (if any) of blackout windows on our findings.
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Columns 9 and 10 include only those trades that are unambiguously permitted, i.e., trades made within the post-earnings (+3 to +24) trading window, while also excluding any trades that occur up to 30 days before an M&A announcement; Columns 11 and 12 explore the remaining "blackout window"
trades. We find that during both blackout and non-blackout periods, opportunistic buys (and sells) are strong predictors of future returns. In contrast, routine trades (buys and sells) have no predictive power for future returns during either blackout or non-blackout periods.
Overall, the results in Table IX indicate that opportunistic trades are much more informative than routine trades for a variety of subsamples: large stocks, small stocks, heavily-traded stocks, lightly-traded stocks, and inside and outside pre-defined blackout windows.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we employ a simple empirical strategy to decode the information in insider trades. Our analysis rests on the basic premise that insiders, while possessing private information, trade for many reasons, and that by identifying exante those trades that are routine (and hence uninformative), one can better isolate the true information that insiders contain about the future of firms. Using simple definitions of routine trades, we are able to systematically and predictably identify insiders as either opportunistic or routine traders throughout our sample.
We show that stripping away the uninformative signals of routine traders leaves a set of information-rich opportunistic trades that are powerful predictors of future firm returns, news, and events. An advantage of our approach is that it weeds out roughly half the universe of insider trades, and specifically the half that has no predictive power for future returns or firm news. Meanwhile the half that remains contains all the predictive power in the insider trading universe.
We show that while the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero, a portfolio strategy that instead focuses solely on opportunistic In exploring the mechanism at work behind our identification and return results, we demonstrate that trades by opportunistic insiders predict future firm news and future firm events, while trades by routine insiders do not. Further, we find that opportunistic traders decrease their trading activity in the wake of increases in the number of news releases by the SEC regarding illegal insider trading cases, consistent with the idea that opportunistic traders are sensitive to the potential costs of illegal insider trading. Finally, we find evidence that some classes of opportunistic insiders that we might expect to be more informed ex-ante (such as local insiders) have trades that are especially informative for future information events.
Collectively our results suggest that it is possible to identify, out of the tens of thousands of insider trades made each year, which trades are truly informative.
Understanding the motives and drivers of other types of information revealed in the market, such as the trades made by banks or institutional investors, and identifying which of these trades have insight into firm value, could lead to a clearer picture of the information environment that helps form asset prices. This table presents an overview of the sample we use in this paper, for which we can define programs (Opportunistic Universe), compared to the entire TFN Insiders database (Insider Universe), between 1989 and 2007. Each year, the opportunistic universe is that universe of insiders who have at least one trade in each of the preceding 3 years (so that routine traders and opportunistic traders can be defined). Panel A presents firm-level characteristics, with all numbers being full sample averages (medians), except for # of unique companies, which is the total number of unique companies over the entire sample period. Size is defined as the market capitalization of the firm in millions of dollars. Book-to-markets that are negative, or greater than 100 (likely mistakes in the data) are excluded from the data. Panel B presents insiderlevel characteristics for both the Opportunistic Universe and the Insider Universe. Trades over the last three years are used to characterize insiders as either routine or opportunistic traders. All subsequent trades that are made after we classify each insider as either routine or opportunistic are then placed into one of two buckets: a) "routine trades" (i.e., all trades made by routine traders), and b "opportunistic trades" (i.e., all trades made by opportunistic traders). Pearson correlation coefficients are calculated over all months and over all available stocks for the following variables. # Opportunistic Buys is the number of opportunistic buys for the given firm and month, and # Routine Buys is the number of routine buys in the given firm in the given month. These variables are defined analogously for sells. Log(Size) is the log of market capitalization as of the end of the previous calendar month. Log(B/M) the log of the book-market ratio, which is the market value of equity divided by Compustat book value of equity. The timing of B/M follows Fama and French (1993) and is as of the previous December year-end. RET is the return in the prior 12 months before the month of trading for the given firm and month. Table I . Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined equivalently for insider sales. Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and book-to-market of the given firm. Past Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior sixth month period. Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively.
# Opportunistic Buys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table I . Number of Opportunistic Buys is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of opportunistic buys in the given firm for the prior month (so is equal to zero if there were zero trades). Number of Routine Buys is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of routine buys in the given firm for the prior month (so is equal to zero if there were zero trades). Number of Opportunistic Sells and Number of Routine Sells are defined equivalently for insider sales. Size and BM are the natural logarithms of the firm characteristics of market equity and book-to-market of the given firm. Past Returns are the return of the given firm over the prior sixth month period. Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table V . Lag 1 Month News is equal to the number of information events (for each respective specification of information events) observed for the given firm in the prior month, while Lag 6 Month News is defined equivalently for information events of the firm in the 6 months prior to last month. Past Month Returns and Past 6 Month Returns are defined equivalently for returns, while Size is described in Table II . Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively.
(1) the number of opportunistic insiders trading in month t+1 divided by the number of all insiders trading in month t+1. The independent variable of interest is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of SEC releases regarding litigation cases against illegal insider activity in month t. We also include control variables for the fraction of opportunistic insiders trading in month t and month t-1, the CRSP value-weight market return in month t, the standard deviation of daily market returns in month t, and various windows of past cumulative market returns (month t-3 to t-1, month t-6 to t-1, and month t-12 to t-1). t-stats based on robust standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table IV . Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates; 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Table I . Opportunistic Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any opportunistic buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to one if there were any routine buys on a given firm in the prior month, and zero otherwise. Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined equivalently for insider sales. Size and BM are the natural logarithms of market equity and book-to-market of the given firm. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the market capitalization distribution, where market cap is measured in December of the prior year. Columns 5 and 6 (7 and 8) include only stocks in the top (bottom) half of the distribution of fraction of shares outstanding traded by insiders in the prior year. Columns 9 and 10 (11 and 12) include only those trades made within (outside) a 21-day trading window (+3 to +24 days) after an earnings announcement, while also excluding (including) any trades that occur up to 30 days before an M&A announcement.
Month fixed effects (Month) are included where indicated. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
